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I. Introduction	
	

	
 In the Preface to his On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche sets as his task to enquire into 
the ‘value’ [Werth] of our ‘values’ [Werthe] (6). By framing the question in this way, Nietzsche 
would appear to be using the term ‘value’ in two different ways.  He uses it in an anthropological 1
sense to pick out the ideals and codes of conduct that people have thus far taken to be valuable. 
When he writes, particularly in the plural, of ‘values’ and traces their genealogy, he would appear, 
in the same spirit, to be using the term as if in inverted commas, with no commitment on his part to 
the axiological standing of the ‘values’ under consideration. Let us call these values in the 
descriptive sense. Yet when Nietzsche considers what value these values themselves have, he would 
seem to be using the term ‘value’ in a more loaded way, where it is reflective (at the very least) of 
what he takes to be valuable. Does Nietzsche, I want to ask, regard his own value judgments on this 
front as having any claim to accuracy? I take it that Nietzsche thinks that it is uncontroversial that 
certain things are instrumentally valuable for a given agent, relative to his or her contingent ends. 
The question in the offing in this paper is whether there is also some more ambitious notion of value 
in his work apart from this. Let us call this genuine value, and let us call the bearers of this property 
genuine values. Values in the descriptive sense have genuine value (or, alternatively, are genuine 
values in addition to being simply descriptive values) insofar as they are accurate to an evaluative 
fact-of-the matter.  	
2
	
 One must stress at the outset that this is a particularly thorny exegetical issue. The textual 
evidence is scant. Nietzsche never sets out his views systematically. And often, when he is speaking 
of the status of ‘values’, it is unclear whether he has in mind simply the descriptive sense or the 
 Clark and Dudrick, “Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity”, are sensitive to a similar distinction. See also Schacht, 1
Nietzsche, 348. 
 Such accuracy needn’t be an all-or-nothing affair. It might be that being a genuine value is a matter of degree. 2
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evaluatively-laden sense. Even assuming that Nietzsche is seeking to pronounce on matters meta-
axiological (and not merely anthropological and sociological) in the passages when he discusses the 
nature and status of ‘values’, what he says in a given snippet of text is often compatible with a 
number of different views, some of which are indeed thoroughly skeptical, but some of which 
would allow for certain descriptive values to be accurate to evaluative facts (if not necessarily to a 
mind-independent evaluative facts) and thereby to have genuine value in the sense at issue. 	

	
 In what follows, I am not going to be attributing to Nietzsche some sophisticated meta-
axiological view. For my part, I am doubtful that he has one.  Standing back from this burgeoning 3
exegetical debate, it might give one serious pause that in the philosophically-sophisticated cottage 
industry on Nietzsche’s meta-ethics and meta-axiology, he has been attributed nearly the full gamut 
of possible views, everything from realism (objective and subjective) to nihilism to expressivism to 
fictionalism to constitutivism to constructivism.  Nietzsche’s texts are no strangers to great 4
interpretive controversy. But I fear that these widely divergent readings may be the result of the fact 
this his texts seriously underdetermine where he stands on these important issues. I will not, 
however, try to substantiate that concern here. My goal in this paper is modest, but important: It is 
not to show that Nietzsche embraced some particular option on the menu of various –isms. It is, 
however, to show that Nietzsche’s texts do not require the skeptical meta-axiological interpretations 
that have been prominent in the recent literature.  And it is thereby to suggest that we needn’t give 5
up on the idea that Nietzsche takes the values he champions to be genuine values—and not because 
he has some sophisticated realist meta-axiological theory of their status, but in a more 
philosophically unreflective way. 	

 See, on this issue, the cautious remarks of Hussain, “Nietzsche’s Meta-ethical Stance”, 412.3
 For example: Objective realism–Schacht, Nietzsche; Subjective realism–Langsam, “How to Combat Nihilism” and 4
Reginster, The Affirmation of Life; Nihilism–Leiter, “Against the Privilege Readings”; Expressivism–Clark and 
Dudrick, “Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity”; Fictionalism–Hussain, “Honest Ilusion”; Constitutivism–Katsafanas, 
“Deriving Ethics from Action”; Constructivism—Silk, “Nietzschean Constructivism”.
 Among the strongest arguments given in the recent literature for seeing Nietzsche as a meta-axiological skeptic–that 5
is, as someone claiming that no descriptive values have genuine evaluative standing–are those of Leiter, “Against the 
Privilege Readings,” Leiter, “Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement”, and of Hussain, “Honest Illusion”. 
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 One of Nietzsche’s guiding philosophical projects, after all, is to offer a critique of a family 
of (in his view) highly problematic ideologies associated with Judeo-Christian morality and its 
secular descendants—ideologies that he sees as imperiling human excellence and cultural 
flourishing. We should not, as I see it, pull the meta-axiological rug out from under his criticism 
without good interpretive arguments in favor of doing so. For in attributing to him blanket meta-
axiological skepticism, we thereby would turn Nietzsche’s guiding project into one that he thinks 
has no authority or legitimacy for anyone else, unless they happen to share his personal evaluative 
preferences. We accordingly should weigh the textual evidence in favor of meta-axiological 
skepticism carefully before concluding that it is a position that Nietzsche himself endorses. 	

	
 I want to begin by discussing some preliminary issues that will need to inform our 
discussion going forward. This stage-setting will be the task of section II. Then we will continue 
with the exegesis in the sections to follow. The basic question to be asked about Nietzsche’s meta-
axiology essentially takes this form: Could Nietzschean ethics really be getting something right, 
that, say, a form of utilitarianism devoted to the ‘green-pasture happiness of the herd’ (BGE, 44) is 
getting wrong?  	
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II. Meta-Axiology, Not (Simply) Meta-Ethics	

	
 Much of the existing secondary literature in this general area focuses on the question of 
Nietzsche’s meta-ethics. Although we may notice affinities Nietzsche has with certain contemporary 
meta-ethical categories—such as naturalist or non-naturalist, cognitivist or non-cognitivist, 
internalist or externalist about reasons—we must tread very carefully before slotting him into any of 
 Leiter frames the central questions as follows: “Is there any fact of the matter about ethical issues? This loosely 6
framed metaphysical question evokes a family of related questions as well: Are there absolute moral truths or are moral 
judgments always relative? Does the world contain objective moral properties or are moral properties simply human 
projections on a morally neutral universe?” “Against the Privilege Readings”, 278. Notice the metaphysical as opposed 
to linguistic orientation in evidence here. By way of contrast, several strands in contemporary meta-ethics would draw 
the party lines of meta-ethics around questions about whether moral discourse is truth apt, questions about whether it is 
describing reality or doing something else, such as expressing our attitudes or our commitment to a system of norms, 
and so on. The question here is: ‘are there genuine values?’, not ‘what is moral language doing?’ I will be addressing 
the former metaphysical question in this paper, not the latter semantic one. 
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these categories. As the title of the paper and the introduction makes clear, I prefer to couch this as 
an investigation into Nietzsche’s ‘meta-axiology’. By framing the issue as a ‘meta-axiological’ one, 
I am trying to remain true to the spirit of Nietzsche’s own way of conceptualizing things. The 
primary normative entities that he concerns himself with are ‘values’ [Werthe], and thus ‘meta-
axiology’ captures this focus well. There are three main considerations that further speak in favor of 
this approach. 	

	
 The first consideration has to do more with the connotation of ‘meta-ethics’ than with the 
actual extension of what it can investigate. Although in theory meta-ethics casts a broad net, so as to 
encompass investigation into the standing of a range of non-moral values as well, in practice it can 
sometimes end up as something that might be better described as meta-morality. There is a danger 
of thinking that the question on the table here is one about Nietzsche’s views about the standing of 
morality (in his sense) exclusively. But the question, we must remember, is as much about the 
standing of Nietzsche’s own values as it is about the standing of the values of morality. These two 
sorts of values needn’t be fellow travelers: Nietzsche can be dubious about status of moral values 
(qua moral values at least) without being dubious about the standing of values tout court. 	

	
 Second, questions of both ethics and meta-ethics frequently take on a practical cast. The 
first-order question often is thought to be ‘What ought I to do?’ or ‘What do I have reason, or most 
reason, to do?’ And the meta-ethical question then is, ‘In virtue of what does this “ought” have 
authority?’ Or: ‘What makes it the case that I have reason, or most reason, to do x?’ ‘Are these 
reasons rooted in what my ideally rational self would desire for me to desire?’ ‘Must they be 
anchored in my subjective motivational set?’  And so on. What I am calling the practical approach 
is of course a very natural way of thinking about ethics, and thus about meta-ethics. Some may even 
regard it as the sine qua non of this branch of philosophy. I don’t mean to suggest that meta-ethics 
would necessarily need to concern itself with the standing of various practical claims exclusively. 
But given the tendency of some of its practitioners to focus their work in this way, I want to be 
abundantly clear that this is not my approach here.	
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 This is because an exclusive focus on the practical is an overly restrictive and distorting 
approach for dealing with Nietzsche’s value theory.  Nietzsche, to be sure, is interested in the 7
practical perspective, and in particular, he is interested in giving an historical account of the genesis 
of a sophisticated modern form of this perspective, as Christine Korsgaard has pointed out.  8
Nietzsche is also of course interested in ethical questions framed from the practical perspective—if 
not from a Kantian agential perspective.  But it would be a mistake to refract Nietzsche’s entire 9
discussion of values, and thus his discussion about the standing of values, through the lens of the 
practical question of what actions a given agent must, or ought, or has reason to perform. Nietzsche 
is not primarily concerned with generating an account whose goal is to prescribe or to assess actions 
that must be performed. Rather, he is concerned with making critical evaluations about individuals 
and cultures.  From these evaluative claims, Nietzsche does not thereby always try to derive 10
practical claims about what people ought or have most reason to do, so as then to assess, perhaps to 
indict people, especially for irrationality, if they fail to live in accordance with or to promote what 
they recognize to be valuable.  	
11
 Geuss, “Outside Ethics”.7
 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 158-60.8
 See, for example, Nietzsche’s vehement rejection of Kant’s ideas about the importance of acting from the motive of 9
duty in A, 11, or his discussion of the duty (presumably in some non-Kantian sense) of higher human beings to treat 
lower human beings tenderly in A, 57.
 Thomson, Normativity, distinguishes between what she calls ‘directives’ (e.g., John ought to be kind his brother) and 10
‘evaluatives’ (e.g., John is a good person) as two basic kinds of normative judgments, p. 2. In these terms, we should 
describe Nietzsche as concerned as much (and perhaps more) with evaluatives as with directives. Railton, “Nietzsche’s 
Normative Theory?” makes a similar point.
 Much of the normative thinking that Nietzsche criticizes is strongly prescriptive in orientation, and its prescriptions 11
are supposed to be anchored in the dictates of reason, and more specifically, these are supposed to be undergirded by the 
possibility of a rational argument justifying the correctness of these prescriptions. Socrates, Plato, and Kant are some of 
the most prominent representatives of this venerable tradition of trying “[w]ith a stiff seriousness that inspires 
laughter...to supply a rational foundation” for morality (BGE, 186). Though Nietzsche is far from being an 
“irrationalist”—the charge peddled by Lukács, The Destruction of Reason, Ch. III, Habermas, The Philosophical 
Discourses of Modernity, Ch. IV and others—Nietzsche is not a “rationalist” either in that he does not seek to anchor 
values in the dictates of reason, nor does he affect to provide a rationally-compelling argument for the superiority of his 
own values. 
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 Because of this focus on the evaluative more than on the directive, the axiological and meta-
axiological structure of Nietzsche’s value theory is arguably in the mold more of aesthetics than of 
ethics, at least as ethics is often conceived of today. We praise artists for realizing aesthetic values 
in their works. We look down on others for creating works that are, say, tawdry or shallow. But the 
normative question, in the first instance, is primarily one of evaluation, not of action-guiding 
directive, especially one backed up by the commands of reason. Consider the typical relation 
between first and second-order evaluations in aesthetics. At the first-order level, the question is an 
evaluative one: Is this painting any good? At the meta-level, the question is about the standing of 
that evaluation itself. Is it objective? Subjectively universal, as Kant would have it? A matter of the 
idiosyncratic preference of a given person or clique? There are no doubt questions to be asked about 
what is to be done in light of these aesthetic values. Are we to contemplate the painting frequently? 
Preserve it from destruction at all costs? Effect a radical life transformation, as the speaker in 
Rilke’s ‘Archaic Torso of Apollo’ feels called to do in the presence of the fragmentary statue? But 
these are downstream, as it were, from questions about the work’s value, downstream regardless of 
what one thinks is responsible for underwriting these claims of what one should do (‘internal’ or 
‘external’ reasons in one form of the contemporary lingo). This is because the question about the 
work’s value is not, in the first instance, a practical question about actions or potential actions.  In 12
the case of aesthetics, it seems bizarre and strained always to try to turn it into one. Nietzsche often 
takes up this aesthetics-influenced approach to evaluative questions, even when it comes to 
questions that have to do not just with art narrowly, but with life more generally. 	

	
 This may, however, tempt us into thinking that what we need is meta-aesthetics, rather than 
meta-ethics, when it comes to the standing of Nietzsche’s values. But this too would be a mistake. 
When we consider the sorts of values Nietzsche celebrates, such as the ‘Pracht’ [magnificence] of 
the greatest human beings (GM, ‘Preface’, 6), it would seem that they are in a sort of overlapping 
 Even if one thinks that in making a judgment of aesthetic merit, one is thereby necessarily disposed to do certain 12
things or have certain desiderative attitudes toward the work of art, the judgment is not itself one about potential actions 
one ought to perform. 
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space between aesthetics and ethics. Pracht is certainly not a moral value, in Nietzsche’s sense of 
‘moral’. Is this an aesthetic value instead? Or an ethical value, by the lights of a Nietzschean 
perfectionistic ethics? There is perhaps a case to be made for both, so long as the categories of the 
ethical and the aesthetic are construed broadly enough. But there is little point, I think, in trying to 
shoehorn this kind of value into either category, given the associations both terms can often conjure 
up—the aesthetic as having to do with art or beauty specifically, the ethical as having to do 
primarily with morality and with the practical stance.  It is better just to say that Nietzsche 
celebrates certain values. At the second-order level, the question is then best thought of as one not 
of meta-ethics narrowly, but of meta-axiology more broadly, the question being: what evaluative 
standing does Nietzsche take his own preferred values to have, compared to other conceptions of 
the good? Does Nietzsche see himself as getting something right that others are getting wrong? 	

"
III. Skepticism About the Standing of Values	

	
 According to an influential reading, Nietzsche does not accord genuine evaluative standing 
to any values, including his own favored values.  That perfectionistic values triumph is for 13
Nietzsche nothing more than his own preference. The vehemence with which Nietzsche trumpets 
his own values and denounces those of others is highly misleading, proponents think. Nietzsche 
resorts to this impassioned rhetoric because he wants to use all the means at his disposal to persuade 
others (potential Nietzschean ‘higher types’ or ‘free spirits’ anyway) to abandon their current 
preferences and to adopt his. But, on this reading, he does not think that his values could really be 
better in the sense of being more accurate to a matter of evaluative fact. In this section and the one 
to follow I will consider the most prominent interpretive arguments for this skeptical position and 
question whether they are adequately supported by Nietzsche’s texts. 	

	
 Nietzsche has recently been thought to advocate an ‘argument from disagreement’, a 
precursor of the sort that are sometimes given in contemporary meta-ethics. On this interpretation, 
 Leiter, “Against the Privilege Readings” and Hussain “Honest Illusion”.13
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Nietzsche argues from the fact of seemingly intractable disagreement about normative claims and 
draws the abductive inference that there is no fact of the matter underlying these competing 
claims.  Regardless of the philosophical merits or demerits of this sort of argument, let us begin by 14
considering what textual evidence we have for thinking that Nietzsche accepts an argument of this 
form.  	
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 The strongest exegetical evidence proponents marshall for this interpretation is a passage 
from the Nachlaß : 	

"
It is a very remarkable moment: the Sophists verge upon the first critique of morality, the first 
insight into morality [Moral]:– they juxtapose the multiplicity (the geographical relativity) of 
moral value judgments; –they let it be known that every morality can be dialectically justified; 
i.e, they divine that all attempts to give reasons for morality are necessarily sophistical– a 
proposition later proved on the grand scale by the ancient philosophers, from Plato onwards 
(down to Kant);– they postulate the first truth that a ‘morality-in-itself’, a ‘good-in-itself’ do 
not exist, that it is a swindle to talk of ‘truth’ in this field (WP, 428). 	
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 From this notebook entry, it is not clear that Nietzsche is making the strong abductive 
inference that the argument from disagreement would require. When Nietzsche appeals to the 
sophists, citing their conclusion that it is ‘a swindle to talk of “truth”’ in this field, the relevant field 
would seem to be that of morality in particular, not obviously the field of values in general.  But 17
 Leiter, “Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement”. Leiter’s emphasis is not on folk disagreement, but on 14
disagreement at the level of rival philosophical theories. 
 For sensible skepticism about a related sort of argument, see Reginster, The Affirmation of Life, 60. 15
 Cited in Leiter, “Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement”.16
 The only reason one could think he is making a more ambitious claim about values in general is his remark en 17
passant that there is no ‘“good-in-itself”’. But this is likely meant as a swipe against Plato. There is, by Nietzsche’s 
lights, no Form of the Good as Plato envisaged it. But simply because Nietzsche rejects what is in his view a 
supernatural and faulty conception of a standard of correctness for values, it doesn’t follow that he is doubtful of any 
standards of correctness whatsoever, particularly when it comes to his own values.
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putting this consideration aside, the passage, as something that Nietzsche never published, is itself 
of questionable pedigree to begin with.  Much of this notebook material is sketchy and ill-18
considered and for good reason never makes it into the polished works Nietzsche chose to publish.  19
And when we look to his published works, there is strong evidence that Nietzsche definitively 
rejects a (similar, though not identical) argument from disagreement. In Book V of The Gay 
Science, Nietzsche derides as ‘childish’ the argument made by those who ‘see the truth that among 
different nations moral valuations are necessarily different and then infer from this that no morality 
is at all binding’ [einen Schluss auf Unverbindlichkeit aller Moral machen]. (GS, 345). If Nietzsche 
will not even accept a form of this argument for undermining morality in particular, he surely will 
not accept it for undermining all values, including non-moral values. The textual case is not very 
strong for attributing to Nietzsche an argument from disagreement, at least one with ambitions of 
establishing a general form of axiological skepticism.  	
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 A second argument notes Nietzsche’s frequent assimilation of value judgments to matters of 
taste.  Nietzsche, for example, characteristically writes: ‘What is now decisive against Christianity 21
is our taste, no longer our reasons’ (GS, 132). From the fact that Nietzsche appeals to taste in his 
criticism of the values of others, it might be inferred that he thinks there are no standards of 
correctness in this realm.  But at the very least, it is far from obvious that someone as elitist and 22
snobbish as Nietzsche would think that there are no standards of correctness in matters of taste, so 
 Leiter, “Against the Privilege Readings”, 287.18
 Leiter, “Against the Privilege Readings”,  287.19
 Leiter, “Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement”. Leiter does not account for GS 345, though, in fairness to him, 20
he might point out that it is focused on disagreement specifically among “nations,” not in rival philosophical theories, 
and that Nietzsche might be dubious about arguments from disagreement in the case of the former without being 
dubious about them in the case of the latter. Nonetheless, the key point for my reading is that even if Nietzsche does 
accept an argument from disagreement, it doesn’t, based on the evidence offered, speak to values in general. In the three 
other passages Leiter cites from the published corpus (BGE 5, 186, and 187), there is no evidence that Nietzsche is 
taking a skeptical stand, on the basis of an argument from disagreement, toward the standing of values in general. 
Nietzsche’s claims in these passages are all more modest. 
 Leiter, “Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement”.21
 Leiter, “Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement”.22
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that the tastes of the ‘Pöbel’ (the rabble—one of his favorite terms of abuse) are not really worse 
than his are. Nietzsche’s remarks about taste do not lend any comfort to meta-axiological 
skepticism, unless one just begs the question from the start with the far-from-obviously-Nietzschean 
assumption that there is no genuine privilege that one person’s taste can have over another’s.	

	
 A third skeptical argument often attributed to Nietzsche is a form of inference to the best 
explanation. Such an argument would have Nietzsche doing something quite ambitious. It would 
see him as holding that appeals to genuine values (that is, values with standing) are idle, since we 
can explain human evaluative commitments by reference to non-evaluative facts.  The best 23
explanation for why people cling to the value claims that they do is not that they are cottoning on to 
the truth regarding the questions at issue, but that they have certain social, psychological, and 
physical needs that drive them to make these particular claims about what is of value, regardless of 
how the world stands axiologically. 	

	
 Nietzsche does think, as a matter of historical genealogy, that he can explain why many 
people come to endorse the evaluative worldviews that they do by appealing to features of their 
social, psychological, and physical condition. It is far more controversial, however, whether 
Nietzsche takes his explanations to lead to the sort of radical eliminativism about genuine values 
that would be needed to underwrite skepticism about the standing of any values. Even proponents 
of this view note that Nietzsche does not explicitly draw this conclusion himself.  Moreover, if 24
Nietzsche did opt for a sort of eliminativism about a range of different values in particular (namely, 
those of morality), he wouldn’t need to be eliminativist about all values, including his own 
perfectionist values. Indeed, even stipulating that Nietzsche thinks one can explain all evaluative 
commitments by reference to wholly non-evaluative facts about the people with those commitments 
and their environment, it is contentious, on purely philosophical grounds, that the strong 
eliminativist conclusion should follow. This recognition may be grounds for something weaker, 
 Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, 148. 23
 As Leiter himself notes,  Nietzsche on Morality, 148.24
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perhaps epistemic humility about one’s first-order value judgments, or agnosticism about the 
standing of values, instead of outright skepticism about the standing of any values. After all, it may 
be overdetermined why people accept the values that they do, or it may be that non-evaluative 
considerations simply have more explanatory heft than evaluative ones, even though there are 
nonetheless genuine evaluative facts.	

	
 And it is bears pointing out how questionable, as a reading of Nietzsche, the claim is that he 
explains all apparent evaluative facts in non-evaluative terms. Nietzsche’s ‘explanations’, such as 
they are, are far from being couched in wholly non-evaluative, cooly scientific terms. In the First 
Essay of the Genealogy, for example, his explanations would seem, on the contrary, to make use at 
times of thick concepts such as nobility and baseness, concepts in which an evaluative dimension 
arguably is already built in. The nobility of certain people, he appears to think, explains why they 
have the value commitments that they do, and the baseness of others explains why they have the 
value commitments that they do (GM, I:10-11). So too, one might suspect, with strength and 
weakness, as Nietzsche is understanding them; they would themselves seem to be evaluatively-
laden concepts. Nietzsche could think that these apparently thick categories are wholly reducible to 
non-evaluative characteristics, but that is by no means obvious. 	

	
 Explanatory arguments with skeptical conclusions have played an important role in meta-
ethics during the past half century, and one may wish to make Nietzsche out to be a forerunner of 
this tradition. Yet, as with attributing Nietzsche the last two positions we considered as well, the 
textual evidence for doing so is at best indecisive. 	

"
IV. Skepticism About the Metaphysical Objectivity of Value?	

	
 So far, we have considered skeptical arguments Nietzsche might have accepted. Proponents 
of the skeptical interpretation think they find even more decisive evidence that regardless of 
whether he had a convincing argument for the view, Nietzsche issues a blanket denial that there 
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could be genuine values.  Two famous passages, in the The Gay Science (301) and Thus Spoke 25
Zarathustra (I, “On the Thousand and One Goals”) respectively, are often appealed to and can seem 
to suggest such a view. But as I will argue in this section, the textual evidence is far more 
ambiguous and less decisive than proponents of this interpretation have recognized. 	

	
 In The Gay Science he writes, ‘Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in 
itself [an sich], according to its nature [seiner Natur nach]–nature [Natur] is always valueless 
[werthlos], but has been given value at some time, as a present–and it was we who gave and 
bestowed it’ [wir waren diese Gebenden und Schenkenden] (GS, 301)].  Such textual evidence 26
might seem to suggest that Nietzsche is doubtful that there are any genuine values. There is simply 
the projection of our attitudes onto axiologically neutral reality.	

	
 But we have to remember that Nietzsche uses ‘value’ / ‘values’ in two quite different senses. 
The descriptive sense is more social and anthropological. The other sense is more axiologically 
loaded. Nietzsche takes the ‘value of these values’ (GM, ‘Preface,’ 6) as a serious question to be 
considered, and not as a pleonasm, precisely because these two different senses of ‘value’ are at 
work. It is an open question for Nietzsche whether certain ‘values’ (in the descriptive sense) are 
really valuable. 	

	
  We should then ask: In the places, such as this, where he talks about value being created or 
bestowed, what sense of values does he have in mind? As descriptive social or anthropological 
 Leiter, “Against the Privilege Readings”; Hussain, “Honest Illusion”; Katsafanas, “Deriving Ethics from Action” also 25
draws on this passage as evidence that Nietzsche thinks that “[t]here are no objective values, or there are no objective 
facts about what is valuable,” 624, and uses this to set up a puzzle, to which he offers his preferred form of 
constitutivism as the solution. If one, as I do, sees Nietzsche’s views about the objectivity of value as underdetermined, 
then this puzzle is more difficult to motivate. However, although Katsafanas rejects the idea of objective facts about 
value, value as such does not get eliminated as a complete chimera. It springs from us in virtue of power being the 
constitutive aim of action. For this reason, I would not classify his view with the other skeptical views I am criticizing. 
 By way of comparison, note the charge he goes on to lay at Christianity’s doorstep in The Antichrist: ‘For one must 26
understand this: every natural custom, every natural institution (state, judicial order, marriage, care of the sick and the 
poor), every demand inspired by the instinct of life–in short, everything that contains its value in itself [was seinen 
Werth in sich hat] is made altogether valueless, anti-valuable by the parasitism of the priest (or the ‘moral world 
order’)... (A, 26). In castigating the priests, he explicitly refers to ‘everything that has its value in itself’—on this 
reading anyway, thus presupposing just what some take him to deny in The Gay Science (301). Although as with the GS 
passage (301) and the TSZ passage (I, “On the Thousand and One Goals”), I think the best reading may be one that 
does not see Nietzsche as here treating truly meta-axiological issues at all. 
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entities, values do indeed stem from us, when individuals, normative systems, and societies take or 
proclaim things to be valuable. Without humans to create them, there would be no such values. 
Nature, Nietzsche claims, is thus ‘werthlos’ (GS, 301), value-less, in this sense, just as it is money-
less, art-less, museum-less, religion-less, ideology-less and all those other things that come into 
being only thanks to human beings. ‘Only we’, he says, ‘have created the world that concerns man!’ 
(GS, 301). We humans, on this reading, are here the ‘gift-givers’ in being essential to bringing 
values into being. As a social or anthropological category, value (like religion or money or art) 
surely cannot be independent of the activities and practices of human beings. But what of the fact of 
certain values really being valuable? Can that be independent of human practices of valuing? If the 
reading I am suggesting here is right, then that is plainly compatible with what Nietzsche says. 
Now, I readily admit that this passage can certainly be read in a more meta-axiologically ambitious 
way, and it has often been. My point is simply that we are not compelled to extract a skeptical meta-
axiological theory from the text, when there is a plausible interpretive alternative. We should, I am 
thus urging, be careful not simply to assume that he is making dramatic meta-axiological claims, 
when it is not clear from the texts whether he is even making a distinctively meta-axiological point 
at all. 	

	
 Suppose for the sake of argument, however, that he is meaning to pronounce on matters 
meta-axiological here. If so, we need to be precise in specifying just what he is denying in claiming 
that nature, in itself, is ‘valueless’ and that values come through a bestowal. This could be read as a 
matter of mere projection. But, on other construals, it is compatible with the existence of genuine 
values.  What one needs for this is simply the idea that the evaluative facts which ground genuine 27
value are themselves not wholly mind-independent facts. Nietzsche might thus be suggesting, in the 
spirit of Euthyphro, that this ‘present’ of value, when bestowed by the right sort of people, creates 
genuine values.  When Euthyphro suggests that the gods’ loving something makes it pious, he 28
 Even Leiter, in his most recent work, “Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement”, seems now to have come around 27
to this possibility. 
 It would of course be a difficult question how to identify such people. 28
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presumably is not claiming it is thereby pious only for them.  The beloved thing is thereby made 29
pious for everyone, though it is not, ‘in itself’ or ‘by its nature’ pious. Nietzsche could have a 
similar view in mind about the grounding of values, perhaps with the genuine philosophers 
described in Beyond Good and Evil (211) as the creators of genuine value.  He could also have a 30
view on which values are secondary qualities, and thus dependent for their status as values on 
humans and their sensibilities and proclivities.  This would be a way for him to maintain that there 31
are indeed genuine values, but that their being so is not a wholly mind-independent matter.	

	
 The key point here is general: even if Nietzsche denies the strong metaphysical objectivity 
of values, he doesn’t thereby undermine the possibility that there might be genuine values. So while 
we do not have enough evidence for attributing to him one of these meta-axiological views in 
particular, we also do not have enough evidence for attributing to him the view that no values enjoy 
genuine evaluative standing simply on the basis of his apparent remarks about values not being part 
of ‘nature’ or of mind-independent reality. 	

	
 Nietzsche continues with these sorts of claims in his next book the following year, Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, where the title character says similar things about humans being the ‘creators’ of 
values:	

"
Only man placed values in things to preserve himself – he alone created a meaning for 
things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself ‘man’, which means: the esteemer. To 
esteem is to create: hear this, you creators! Esteeming itself is of all esteemed things the 
most estimable treasure. Through esteeming first is there value [Durch das Schätzen erst 
 Euthyphro 10d ff29
 Alex Silk, “Nietzschean Constructivism”, argues for a constructivist reading in this vein. 30
 My thanks to Errol Lord for suggesting this possibility as also potentially compatible with what Nietzsche says.31
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giebt es Werth] : and without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear this, 32
you creators (TSZ, I, “On the Thousand and One Goals”). 	

"
It is, to be sure, notoriously difficult to extract philosophical doctrine from Zarathustra. But this 
should make us even more cautious that this passage is a straightforward brief in favor of 
axiological skepticism. This passage, similar to the one from The Gay Science, is just as naturally 
read as making a claim about values in the descriptive sense, as sociological or anthropological 
entities. Nietzsche, after all, is throughout this section emphasizing the human dimension in the 
creation of these sorts of descriptive values. He is encouraging us to realize that particular value 
systems have been the contingent creation of human beings at particular times in history, as the 
result of what they happen to esteem, whether honor or piety or loyalty or self-abnegation. ‘A tablet 
of the good hangs over every people. Behold, it is the tablet of their overcomings; behold, it is the 
voice of their will to power’ (TSZ, ibid.). His aim in the passage, as I see it, is to explain how 
proclaiming and coming to regard certain things as valuable ends up furthering the interests (and the 
wills-to-power) of particular human communities and individuals.  It could be that Nietzsche thinks 
there is nothing beyond this contingent esteeming by particular people.  But nothing in the passage 
speaks strongly in favor of this, and nothing renders this skeptical reading more plausible than the 
alternative I am suggesting. It is just not clear that Nietzsche is addressing truly meta-axiological 
issues in this passage at all. 	

	
 But, once again, let us suppose for the sake of argument that Nietzsche is meaning to offer a 
meta-axiological theory here. The text, again, is compatible with the two non-skeptical lines (the 
 Kaufmann renders this: ‘Through esteeming alone is there value’. This translation of ‘erst’ is most naturally read as 32
prejudging the issue of whether esteeming x is a sufficient condition for x to be a value. It is making it seem as if being 
a value comes about solely though the esteeming. (Although, it bears pointing out that a partisan of gin martinis could 
intelligibly say, ‘Through gin alone is there a Martini’. This wouldn’t necessarily need to signal fondness for the 
Winston Churchill vermouth-free Martini. Instead, it can pick out one salient element against a background of other 
possibilities. I am in essence saying, as I believe is true, ‘The vodka martini is an aberration, a contradiction in terms. 
Though gin alone (as opposed to vodka, or rum or whatever) can a martini be made.’)  If the ‘erst’ is, however, 
understood as ‘first’ or ‘primally’, also possible translations for it, then it is more clearly noting an essential ingredient, 
or perhaps even just a necessary background condition, for something being a value is that it be esteemed. It is not 
saying that being a value is simply a matter of this. 
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Euthyphro-inspired and secondary qualities views) that I just sketched, as well as with views, such 
as that recently defended by Joseph Raz, on which values are in a different way dependent on 
human valuers. According to Raz, values require valuers and a web of social practices to sustain 
them, and furthermore, new values, with genuine axiological standing, can rightfully be said to be 
created, in some sense, by human beings.  Though being regarded as valuable is not a sufficient 33
condition for being valuable, it is a necessary one. Even if these views are not philosophically 
satisfying, all are intelligible positions. For reasons of space, I cannot explore any of them further 
here. My point, in any event, is a broader one about the range of philosophical options that the texts 
leave open: Nietzsche does not clearly opt for any views of this sort, but neither does he explicitly 
opt for a sort of eliminativism regarding the possibility of genuine values, including non-moral 
values. Thus, even if Nietzsche is talking about meta-axiology in these key passages, it is not clear 
what he takes to follow from the apparently anti-objective metaphysics of value about the 
possibility of genuine values nonetheless, since he never says that in order to be a genuine value, 
something would need to be wholly mind-independent. It is not clear that this Platonic commitment 
is one Nietzsche shares. In fact, that may be precisely what he is trying to call into question. 	

"
V. Perspectival Value	

	
 In order to lend more precision to the way in which Nietzsche thinks of values as potentially 
having (or lacking) objective standing, I’d now like to turn to consider Bernard Reginster’s 
important recent interpretation. Reginster’s interpretation is more nuanced than others in the sort of 
objectivity about the standing of values that it sees Nietzsche as rejecting. Reginster, it seems to me, 
is right to think that Nietzsche, throughout his career, rejects a Platonic metaphysics of value. 
Reginster goes further and shows that Nietzsche also rejects a more constructivist brand of 
Kantianism that would see values as grounded in facts about what we rationally could will.  34
 Raz, The Practice of Value.33
 Whether such a form of constructivism is Kant’s own meta-ethical view is another, more contentious matter that I will 34
not consider here. 
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Reginster draws on Nietzsche’s criticisms of Kant’s practical philosophy, as well as on Nietzsche’s 
notion of perspectivism, to make his exegetical case. According to Reginster, Nietzsche rejects (in 
Reginster’s terms) the sort of ‘normative objectivism’ present in Plato and Kant and opts for a form 
of ‘normative subjectivism’ instead. 	
35
	
 What is it that Reginster means by values being ‘objective’ (or, by contrast ‘subjective’) 
here? Reginster draws the line between the objective and the subjective in a way parallel to the 
debate about external reasons and internal reasons from contemporary meta-ethics. According to 
Reginster’s ‘normative subjectivism’, something is valuable for me only if it is anchored in my 
subjective motivational set. Taking the Nietzschean notion of a perspective to be akin to a 
subjective motivational set, Reginster argues that in order for something to be a value for me, it has 
to be a value anchored in my own contingent evaluative perspective.  The problem with forms of 
‘normative objectivism’—Platonism and the constructivist brand of Kantianism—is, according to 
Reginster’s reconstruction of Nietzsche, that they neglect this and try to ground what is valuable for 
me—and indeed for everyone—in alleged facts about what is non-perspectivally valuable, in virtue 
of the metaphysically objective Form of the Good or facts about what any person (not me with my 
contingent desires in particular) rationally must will. 	

	
 This is an intriguing suggestion. But my resistance to this reading comes down to how we 
are to construe the meta-axiological import of Nietzsche’s perspectivism in this context. 
Perspectivism, on a more anthropological and less meta-axiological construal than Reginster’s, 
might instead tell us that what people take as valuable depends on their perspective, in the sense 
that it depends on how their social situation and their psychological needs color their view of the 
world. If my perspective is one of the Christian, I will, Nietzsche thinks, probably take a life of 
devoted service to God to be the most valuable life for me. Because my entrenched commitments 
influence my way of looking at things, certain things will show up as valuable to me. This 
anthropological construal would seem to make quite good sense of the visual element of 
 Reginster, The Affirmation of Life, 58 ff.35
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Nietzsche’s multifarious metaphor of a perspective. It is, in the first instance, a claim about how 
things look to people, in virtue of their position with respect to those things. It is a considerable 
step, however, to saying that a perspective, in a more idealist fashion, also influences how things 
axiologically are. For does my seeing things in this way—that is, from this perspective—make it 
so? Does this make things valuable for me? 	

	
 There is a weaker and a stronger way for a perspective to play a role in determining whether 
something is valuable for a given person. The weaker version Nietzsche may well accept, given 
what might be described as his anti-Procrusteanism: There is no single way of life that is best for 
everyone (at least when that way of life is spelled out with some degree of specificity). A few are 
cut out to be free spirits, most to be slaves ‘in some sense or other’ (BGE, 257). What specific way 
of life is best for you, according to Nietzsche, depends on features of you, including your pre-
existing and maybe intractable evaluative perspective. Thus, if you have a given set of features, 
including a given evaluative perspective, then the best sort of life (or range of lives, maybe) for you 
is such-and-such. But on the stronger reading of how a perspective makes it the case that something 
is valuable, the claim would be that the truth of that conditional itself—and, even more extremely, 
the truth of all value claims (for you)—is dependent on your perspective: That your perspective 
(specifically, its underpinnings in your desiderative economy) has it that a given life is the best life 
for you makes it the case, in this stronger way, that it is. That your perspective has it that such-and-
such is valuable makes it the case that it is (for you). Some with certain Humean commitments will 
find this point congenial on independent philosophical grounds, but the question is whether it can be 
squared with Nietzsche’s texts. I have my doubts, because it becomes very difficult to reconcile 
with his idea that an evaluative perspective might itself be radically faulty. 	

	
 Some perspectives are jaundiced by ‘life-negating’ ideology. They may permit the agents 
who hold them to eke out meager survival. But it doesn’t mean that these are the accurate 
evaluative perspectives, in the sense that they are adequate to the evaluative facts. In The Antichrist 
Nietzsche is very clear that perspectives can be inadequate to these facts: 	
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"
Against this theologians’ instinct I wage war: I have found its traces everywhere. Whoever 
has theologians’ blood in his veins, sees all things in a distorted and dishonest perspective to 
begin with. The pathos which develops out of this condition calls itself faith: closing one’s 
eyes to oneself once and for all, lest one suffer the sight of incurable falsehood. This 
erroneous [fehlerhaften] perspective on all things is elevated into a morality, a virtue, a 
holiness; the good conscience is tied to faulty vision; and no other perspective is conceded 
any further value once one’s own has been made sacrosanct with the names of ‘God’, 
‘redemption’, and ‘eternity’ [...] Whatever a theologian feels to be true must be false: this is 
almost a criterion of truth. His most basic instinct of self-preservation forbids him to respect 
reality at any point or even to let it get a word in. Wherever the theologians’ instinct extends, 
value judgments have been stood on their heads and the concepts of ‘true’ and ‘false’ are of 
necessity reversed: whatever is most harmful to life is called ‘true’; whatever elevates it, 
enhances, affirms, justifies it, and makes it triumphant, is called ‘false’ (A, 9). 	

"
If Nietzsche thought perspectives were akin to subjective motivational sets, then there would be no 
way for they themselves to be false. But that is just what he appears to think in this passage. 	

	
 Perhaps one can make a better case for this strong reading of the relation between 
perspectives and values based on the Preface to Beyond Good and Evil. Here Nietzsche sets up 
perspectivism as an alternative to Platonism about value, lambasting Plato’s ‘invention’ of ‘the pure 
spirit [reinen Geiste] and the good in itself’ [Guten an sich]. This Platonic way of looking at things, 
Nietzsche says, amounts to ‘standing truth on her head and denying [verleugnen] perspective, the 
basic condition of all life’. One might take this as grist for the mill and think that Nietzsche is 
denying the possibility that anything is valuable, except relative to the contingent evaluative 
perspective of a given person. But there is considerable space between denying that Platonic picture 
and moving to a view on which our motivational sets make it the case that things are valuable for 
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us. We canvassed in Section IV some ways in which Nietzsche might be read as denying the 
complete metaphysical objectivity of genuine values, by insisting there is some important human 
contribution (Euthypro-style response dependence, a secondary qualities view, a social dependence 
view, etc.). The Platonic form of the good would be denying that there is any human contribution 
like this, and this may well be what Nietzsche is meaning to challenge in criticizing Plato’s ‘denial’ 
of perspective in this context.	

	
 I think there is an even more modest reading still. The dogmatist’s error is, in Kaufmann’s 
translation, to ‘deny’ [verleugnen] perspective. But what does this mean? We could think of it as a 
philosophical thesis: namely, the denial that the good has any perspectival element. That was the 
view I just considered. But verleugnen can also mean ‘to disown’ or ‘to repudiate’. This is to refuse 
to be associated with something, to think it is beneath one’s dignity or to think it would sully one’s 
honor to do so. When the conservative parents ‘disown’ or ‘repudiate’ their lesbian daughter, they 
are rejecting her, not giving up belief in her very existence. On my preferred reading, the dogmatist 
is not only denying perspective, in the sense of holding an aperspectival theory of the good, which 
Plato certainly does, but also disowning or repudiating perspectives as important objects of 
philosophical study. 	

	
 Nietzsche sets his own way of philosophizing up as an alternative to the dogmatist’s. 
Whereas the dogmatist’s only concern is investigating the truth about the right values and about 
other enduring philosophical questions, Nietzsche is a perspectivist because he is also interested in 
investigating people’s perspectives on these questions, including the question of what is valuable. 
This, I think, is one of the reasons Nietzsche’s philosophy is so difficult to assimilate into the 
philosophical tradition. Most philosophers are interested just in the eternal truth about metaphysics, 
epistemology, morality, and so on. Nietzsche is unusual in being just as interested in why people 
believe what they do about these subjects—in particular what physiological, psychological, 
historical, and social factors incline them to hold the views that they do.	
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  The trouble with dogmatic philosophizing, exemplified in Plato most especially, is its 
single-minded concern with the timeless truths about what really is the case. These are thought the 
only truths worth philosophy’s attention. It repudiates, as unworthy of truly philosophical inquiry, 
this whole other range of interesting truths about why people come to believe what they do on these 
issues. Nietzsche, on the contrary, thinks that these perspectives are a fertile area of inquiry. 
Consider Part I of Beyond Good and Evil, coming right on the heels of his complaint that Plato has 
‘denied’ or ‘disowned’ perspective. Nietzsche spends much of this section, ‘On the Prejudices of 
Philosophers’, discussing why past philosophers have been tempted by the views they have. So too 
in Parts III and V, where his concerns are with the human phenomena of religion and morality 
respectively, recurring themes for him before and after Beyond Good and Evil. His concern, when it 
comes to these phenomena, is just as much with why people hold these views as with giving 
arguments for what the right views in the field are. 	

	
 But to treat the issue of Nietzsche’s perspectivism in detail is far beyond my scope here. My 
own suspicion is that he has no unified doctrine of perspectivism, but rather an interestingly 
pregnant metaphor with a range of possible interpretations. I have just meant tentatively to sketch 
an alternative interpretative possibility, insofar as that metaphor might be drawn upon in order to 
shed light on Nietzsche’s value theory. On my proposed reading, Nietzsche can be understood as 
getting at something much less meta-axiologically ambitious with his perspectivism than 
interpreters have often held. In any event, given that the understanding of perspectives as akin to 
subjective motivational sets is incompatible with what Nietzsche says in The Antichrist and its not 
necessitated by what he says in Beyond Good and Evil, we can construe perspectivism, I suggest, as 
a minimal thesis about what value judgments an agent’s psychological and social condition will 
incline her to make. If we accept this less meta-axiologically ambitious understanding of 
perspectivism, then we can reject Platonism about value and the Kantian rationalist-constructivist 
thesis without needing to go so far as to accept what Reginster calls ‘normative subjectivism’ as 
Nietzsche’s view about the standing of values. We can think that while there are objective (in some 
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weak sense) facts about value, these needn’t be anchored in Platonic truths, nor need they be 
constructed out of the deliverances of practical reason. They might, however, be objective in the 
sense that they needn’t be dependent on being rooted in a person’s subjective motivational set in 
order to have the evaluative standing for that person that they do.  	
36
"
VI. Conclusion	
 	

	
 One of the major obstacles thus far to seeing Nietzsche as, in some sense, a value realist—
and by that I just mean someone who is not doubtful that there are genuine values—is that it has 
been argued that if he is realist about value, then he must be read as trying to ground all value in the 
will to power. And given that the latter project, judging from the works he chose to publish, is not 
clearly Nietzsche’s and is of dubious philosophical merits on its own terms, Nietzsche, this 
argument goes, must not be read as accepting realism about value.  But that is a particularly 37
implausible variant of value realism both textually and philosophically. By showing that Nietzsche 
shouldn’t be attributed such a strongly reductionist view about what features of the world ground 
value, one does not thereby foreclose the idea that he is realist of some stripe about value. The value 
theory suggested in the published works is more pluralistic in what it suggests as the bearers of 
value.  Here we move into the territory of issues that are no longer in Nietzsche’s second-order 38
meta-axiology, but in his first-order theory of what is valuable. Working that out is not the project of 
this paper. But the point relevant for our discussion here is this: If Nietzsche is a realist about value, 
 The idea that values must be anchored in one’s desiderative economy in order to have the standing that they do 36
depends, it seems to me, on the overly practical way of conceiving of all values that I was urging caution about before. 
Just what import is the internalist motivational claim supposed to be have, if we construe the structure of values in less 
practical terms, more along the lines of aesthetic evaluation than along the lines of practical reasons for action? Can’t 
there just be a question about what is valuable and whether some judgments of value are more accurate than others? 
Need all these questions be translated into questions about what is to be done by given agents and whether individual 
agents could be motivated to do those things?
 Leiter, “Against the Privilege Readings,” 280.37
 Peter Railton has sketched what seems to me to be a pluralistic realist view in his “Nietzsche’s Normative Theory?”38
 23
we do not need to see him as trying to reduce all values to exercises of the will to power, a 
questionable idea he toys with only in notebook passages he never publishes. 	
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 The puzzle typically arises for those working on Nietzsche’s value theory about what his 
views on issues of meta-ethics and meta-axiology were. The answer, I suspect, is that his thoughts 
on these topics do not amount to a clear position. While one can certainly seek to develop a meta-
axiology in a Nietzschean spirit, where the goal is simply to come up with something 
philosophically respectable and interesting that is not incompatible with what Nietzsche says and is 
inspired to some degree by what he does say, my project here is more historical and exegetical in 
character. If we stick to what Nietzsche himself actually says about the standing of values, we see 
that it is quite sketchy and does not strongly support the sorts of complex positions that have been 
attributed to him. The evidence is just too thin. In contrast to his provocative perfectionism and to 
his groundbreaking anthropology of morality and critique of the same, topics on which what 
Nietzsche has to say is vastly more developed, his meta-axiology is just not, in my opinion, where 
his interests or his strengths as a philosopher lie. I have not, however, tried to establish that here. I 
have worked in this paper toward a modest conclusion: Given that his expressed views do not 
foreclose the possibility that he grants evaluative standing to the perfectionistic values he 
champions, we should at least leave open this possibility. The Nietzsche that so many philosophers 
think they know—the Nietzsche who is alleged to be skeptical that there are any genuine values—is 
just not the philosopher to whom his texts straightforwardly point 	

	
 Of course, it is a general feature of Nietzsche’s aphoristic and poetic philosophical style that 
numerous positions can be extracted from the text. Proponents of the skeptical readings may agree 
that the texts don’t decisively settle the question of his meta-axiology, but on balance, still think that 
their view is the best reading of the texts. Now, we can all acknowledge that Nietzsche is critical of 
many of the values (in the descriptive sense) that we have inherited and is dubious about the 
spurious legitimacy that they claim for themselves. But does he go beyond this, so as to be skeptical 
 Cf., WP, 55 [KSA, 13:422-27]; WP, 674 [KSA, 13:39-40]. 39
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of the very idea that anything is really valuable? This has the surprising and, to my mind, 
unsatisfying result that Nietzsche thinks the great multitude laboring under a form of ideology are 
not mistaken in their outlook. It could be that Nietzsche thinks this. Yet at the risk of defanging 
Nietzsche’s impassioned critique of the ideologies we have inherited, this seems to me a position of 
last resort.   40
 I am grateful to audiences at Princeton University, Oxford University, the University of Virginia, and the Humboldt 40
Universität zu Berlin for helpful discussion following presentations of this material. My thanks as well to Alexander 
Nehamas, Anthony Cross, Benjamin Kiesewetter, and Errol Lord, as well as three anonymous referees for this journal 
for their written comments in response to this paper. 
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